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FINANCIAL SERVICES FOR MICROENTERPRISES: 
PROGRAMS OR MARKETS? 
INTRODUCTION 
For more than two decades, government agencies and donors 
have pumped billions of dollars into agricultural credit programs 
in developing countries. Broadly speaking, the objective has 
been to expand the supply and reduce the cost of loans, especial-
ly for small farmers. It was expected that through this ''supply-
leading'' approach to rural finance, technological change would 
accelerate, agricultural output would expand and small farmer 
incomes would rise. 
The great concern today for microenterprise credit is remi-
niscent of this earlier preoccupation with agricultural credit. 
The rationale, the approach, the earmarking of funds, the 
targeting of beneficiaries, the rationalization for poor institu-
tional performance are similar to that earlier period. Small 
business programs, of course, have as long and checkered a 
history as does agricultural credit, but most advocates cast 
aside that experience in their zeal for microenterprise develop-
ment. It is appropriate, therefore, to review the now abundant 
analysis of the small farmer credit experience. That experience 
can provide a framework for anticipating and analyzing issues 
related to microenterprise financing. The lessons learned should 
help prevent a repetition of past errors and reduce private costs 
to the individuals directly affected and social costs for the 
society as a whole. 
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SMALL FARMS AND NONFARM ENTERPRISESl 
A useful point of departure is to identify the similarities 
and differences between small farm and nonfarm enterprises. The 
similarities are significant. They both are small by definition 
whether measured in terms of scale of production, capital 
invested or persons employed. Most employ only family labor. 
The technology utilized is traditional and may be several 
generations behind the most modern enterprises of the same type 
in the country. Incomes and wages are low, frequently below wage 
rates in the modern sector; therefore, they are often viewed as 
subsistence operations. Some may sell only a fraction of their 
total production and are not well integrated into factor and 
product markets. Likewise, they have limited access to govern-
ment programs and escape many laws and government regulations. 
In fact, many nonfarm enterprises can survive only by avoiding 
laws and regulations that apply to larger enterprises. 
Although they may have deposit and saving accounts, both 
types of enterprises receive little credit from formal institu-
tions. Loans from friends and relatives furnish much of their 
start-up capital. They self-finance most of their working 
capital. Informal lenders provide them with short-term loans 
frequently at interest rates much higher than regular bank rates. 
The entrepreneurs participate in a variety of self-help groups, 
many of which have savings and loan programs. Rotating credit 
societies (ROSCAs) frequently provide a means of savings, and 
access to loans for emergencies or selected investments. 
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Although they aren't well integrated into formal financial 
institutions, small enterprises have a rich mosaic of financial 
transactions. They are frequently small scale lenders and 
borrowers at the same time, making loans to friends or relatives 
while taking a loan from a trader. They build up borrowing 
capacity through voluntary savings, through participation in 
traditional social groups, and through linking themselves with 
others who do borrow from formal institutions - landlords, 
traders, suppliers of inputs, richer entrepreneurs. They value 
and preserve these relationships because with their limited cash 
and capital reserves they need the insurance of being able to 
borrow in cases of emergency or unusual opportunity. To preserve 
good relations with informal sources of loans, they repay 
informal loans before formal ones when they experience cash 
constraints. 
There are, however, important differences between the two 
types of enterprises. It is a well known fact that the relative 
importance of agriculture declines with economic growth while the 
industrial and service sectors increase. Therefore many small 
farmers will eventually disappear but the number of small nonfarm 
enterprises will rise. Farmers produce largely homogeneous goods 
and cannot easily differentiate their products. Nonfarm enter-
prises often thrive precisely because they successfully develop a 
product that finds a market niche. Farm enterprises suffer the 
risk of natural disasters - weather, disease, pests - but nonfarm 
enterprises also have their share of risks such as interruptions 
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in supplies of water, electricity, and other key production 
inputs. They also risk the heavy hand of government if they are 
discovered to be operating without an appropriate license, or are 
caught disobeying labor laws, or are found to be robbing elec-
tricity. 
Although small scale enterprises face innumerable obstacles 
that threaten their survival, policymakers especially note the 
few formal loans, the lack of long term loans and the high 
interest rates paid on informal loans, and immediately conclude 
that credit is their real bottleneck (or at least it is the one 
problem they think they can do something about in the short 
term). Furthermore, existing financial institutions, especially 
banks, are "bad". They are perceived as being overly cautious, 
risk averse and unimaginative with respect to small enterprise 
lending. Instead, they prefer to lend to their friends in larger 
enterprises, industry, commerce and trade. No consideration is 
given to the value that banks provide in supplying safe, depend-
able deposit and savings services. The "need" of small enter-
prises is diagnosed as cheap loans. 
SUPPLY-LEADING FINANCE2 
This perception of unsatisfied demand for loans and assumed 
inadequacies in supply of funds from the banking system has led 
policymakers, often in conjunction with donors, to develop a 
strategy in which increasing the supply of funds was expected to 
"lead'' economic activities. The following summary characterizes 
many of the policies and programs designed for agricultural 
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credit, and many of these features are also found in small or 
microenterprise programs. 
1. Increase the supply of funds available for lending to the 
priority sector (small farm or nonfarm enterprises) through: 
a. loan portfolio quotas or targets for existing lenders, 
b. the creation of specialized financial institutions to 
work only with the priority sector(s), 
c. grants and subsidies for non-financial institutions 
(ministries, departments, institutes, NGOs, PVOs), 
d. central bank rediscount programs, often funded by 
donors. 
e. mandatory placement of bank and/or public sector 
deposits in specialized lending institutions, 
f. nationalization of banks that fail to meet social 
objectives. 
2. Reduce the interest rate on loans made to the priority 
sector through: 
a. interest rate ceilings on loans which set the lowest 
rates for the smallest/poorest borrowers, 
b. low interest rates charged by the central bank on 
refinance funds, 
c. encouraging banks to cross-subsidize by charging higher 
rates to non-priority borrowers in compensation for low 
rates to priority borrowers, 
d. direct government interest subsidies to lenders. 
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3. Reduce lending risks and costs through: 
a. detailed targeting of loans including specifications 
about production practices and input use required of 
borrowers, 
b. crop and loan guarantee programs, 
c. creation of joint liability through lending to groups 
of borrowers, 
d. technical assistance to lenders to help improve 
institutional efficiency. 
These financial measures are often taken in conjunction with 
programs to provide technical assistance, modern inputs, market-
ing, business management support and other services. These 
services are linked to finance when extension agents are required 
to authorize farm loans made by banks. Alternatively, they may 
be included in an integrated package of inputs and services 
provided by a government agency or an NGO. 
The supply-leading financial strategy has succeeded in 
expanding lending, at least temporarily, to target groups in some 
countries. Some financial institutions have gained experience in 
lending to a new clientele, and some have introduced innovations 
to more efficiently serve their customers. The failures of the 
strategy are more numerous, however. They have been extensively 
documented elsewhere3 and will only be summarized here. 
1. Lending quotas and targets have been ignored or evaded by 
lenders through creative loan documentation and multiple 
small loans to large borrowers. 
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2. Lenders employ the alternatives offered to increased lending 
such as investing in low interest government securities. 
3. Rural deposit mobilization is discouraged. 
4. Interest rate controls result in non-interest rationing of 
loans that raises borrower transaction costs and concen-
trates loans among wealthier borrowers. 
5. Entrepreneurs divert cheap loans from targeted purposes to 
higher return uses of funds, and substitute borrowed funds 
for own capital. 
6. Heavy reporting and documentation costs create high lender 
transaction costs. 
7. Political intervention directs subsidized loans to favored 
clients and protects delinquent borrowers. 
a. Lenders experience high loan delinquency and default. 
9. The viability of lending institutions is undermined because 
of their failure to cover costs, recover loans, and mobilize 
deposits. 
10. Lenders are unreliable sources of funds for their customers 
because they are prisoners to the ebbs and flows of govern-
ment and donor funds. 
In summary, a few select borrowers have enjoyed a one-shot 
increase in liquidity but viable institutions have not been 
built. A viable rural financial institution is one that is self-
sustaining, that covers its costs, that provides services valued 
by rural households and businesses, that serves an ever increas-
ing number of customers, that is dynamic in providing new 
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financial products and services, and that actively searches for 
ways to reduce transaction costs for itself and/or its customers. 
By implication, it operates over a long time horizon and becomes 
a reliable institution for its clientele. 
PROGRAMS OR MARKETS? 
The negative experience of small farmer credit provides 
insights into the alternative strategies to develop financial 
services for microenterprises. At one end of the continuum of 
possibilities is the "financial markets approach" that has the 
objective of developing viable financial institutions competing 
to serve a large number of customers with a variety of financial 
products. At the other end is the ''program approach" that has 
the objective of meeting credit needs of a specific target 
population usually with subsidies for the borrower and the 
lending institution. The institutional form in the first case is 
usually a financial institution, frequently some type(s) of bank. 
Although many credit programs are implemented through banks, the 
emphasis in the second case is on a wide variety of nonbank 
institutions whose primary or exclusive role is to provide loans: 
government agencies, institutes, associations, NGOs and PVOs. A 
comparative analysis of the two broad alternatives of programs 
versus markets follows. 
Access 
The "need" for credit is widely debated (Hunt), but it is 
probably true that loans draw clients to small enterprise 
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projects (Ashe). Our fundamental concern should be the extent to 
which small enterprises have access to financial services. The 
market approach is criticized because banks don't serve a large 
enough number of target clients, yet frequently the credit 
programs of banks serve many more low-income customers than 
nonbank programs. Some of the biggest programs are found in 
Asia. Timberg reports that the Indian IRDP (Interest Rate 
Differential Program) reached over 15 million families in the 
period 1980-85. Indonesia has several bank programs, and the BKK 
(Badan Kredit Kecamatan) program from 1972-1983 provided 2.7 
million loans totaling over $55 million (Goldmark and Rosengard). 
Likewise, the Bangladesh Grameen Bank is reported to currently 
have about 70,000 groups with 350,000 members operating in over 
7,500 villages. Furthermore, it is likely that statistics 
reporting participation in bank programs underestimate total 
small enterprise access because they usually do not count the 
number of small, but untargeted, loans provided out of regular 
bank funds. By comparison, many nonbank programs operate in only 
one or a handful of locations and access is limited to several 
dozen or a few hundred participants. One NGO program I recently 
visited in the Philippines had eight loans! Moreover, it is not 
the case that bank programs cannot reach the poorest with the 
smallest loans. Many of the bank loans made in India, Indonesia, 
and Bangladesh are quite small. 
Access is directly related to proximity. Banks with a 
widespread branch network or a nationwide system of unit banks 
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reduce borrower transaction costs through their proximity to 
entrepreneurs4 . A PVO or a cooperative working in a few villages 
or a government program with only one office for the entire 
country located in the capital city cannot provide access to many 
people, particularly for small loans where noninterest costs 
(including travel time and expense) represent a large share of 
total borrowing costs. 
Interest rates also have an important impact on access. A 
policy of charging interest rates high enough to cover costs is 
frequently rejected by advocates of lending to the poor. Yet the 
choice may be serving fewer people with lower-cost loans versus 
serving more with unsubsidized loans. Programs that require 
subsidies deny their services to nonparticipants when they fail 
to expand operations by recovering costs from participants. 
Furthermore, interest rate ceilings on banks are self-defeating 
and raise the cost of credit to the very sector that the govern-
ment intends to support. The transaction costs and risks of 
lending to small enterprises is perceived as being greater than 
lending larger loans to other sectors so banks either will not 
lend to the small scale sector or will pass on to borrowers a 
greater share of the risks and costs through noninterest charges 
(Bhatt; Cuevas and Graham). Low interest ceilings and fixed 
interest spreads have tended to benefit larger borrowers with 
collateral in Asia at the expense of smaller borrowers with 
little collateral but with profitable projects (Hiemenz and 
Bruch). 
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Low loan rates also imply low rates paid on deposits; this 
thwarts an institution's ability to mobilize deposits. Without 
deposits, a lender is dependent on donor and/or government funds. 
These sources have proven to be quite uncertain; at times, the 
institution has funds to expand lending while at other times it 
does not. 
Inflation erodes the real value of a loan portfolio. If 
interest rates are too low to cover inflation, the real value of 
new loans made will decline even if the institution achieves 100 
percent loan recovery. 
There are obvious limits to the level of interest rates that 
borrowers can pay. Theory suggests that if little capital is 
used in an enterprise, the marginal return on its use must be 
high. This implies that the marginal return from borrowing 
should also be high, at least for small, incremental loans. 
Although small entrepreneurs frequently report that one of their 
chief problems is lack of credit, they often do not consider the 
interest rate to be an important factor. They put higher 
priority on speed of loan disbursement, availability of second 
loans and simplicity of procedures (Ashe). The large amount of 
lending to poor people that occurs in the Indonesian BKK program 
with rates of 5 to 10 percent per month, in the Grameen Bank with 
effective rates exceeding 25 percent per year, and in the 
Bangladesh Rural Finance Experimental Project with rates up to 36 
percent per year support this observation. 
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Credit guarantee schemes have been used in several countries 
to overcome lender resistance to small enterprise lending. These 
schemes aim to encourage financial institutions to lend to small 
businesses that have viable projects but that are unable to 
provide adequate collateral or cannot prove they are credit-
worthy. These schemes have frequently not lived up to expecta-
tions. They are costly, complex to design and manage, and it is 
not clear that they have really contributed to much additionality 
in lending (Hiemenz and Bruch; Levitsky and Prasad). 
Viability 
Institutional viability is closely related to access. If an 
institution cannot achieve viability and support itself, the 
expansion of its services to new participants will be controlled 
by the amount of subsidies it can extract from governments and 
donors. By definition, poor countries cannot afford large 
subsidies, yet since the poor are so numerous, large subsidies 
are required if many are to be reached. Donors cannot be relied 
upon to provide an increasing flow of new resources to keep an 
institution expanding. 
The level of interest rate charged on loans and the spread 
between that rate and the cost of funds is crucial to determining 
institutional viability. Although interest expense is usually a 
small component of a borrower's total operating expense, interest 
income is the most important source of revenue for a bank and may 
also be important for a nonbank program. Interest rate regula-
tions must be relaxed so the operating spread is more favorable. 
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Cheap government and donor funds aren't necessarily a substitute 
because of the costs of reporting and documenting their use and 
impact. For example, Cuevas and Graham found that lender 
transaction costs for lending through a government-owned and a 
privately-owned bank in Honduras far exceeded the 3-4 percent 
margin allowed with donor funds. Lending costs for the private 
bank using donor funds were nearly five times the cost of lending 
its own money for farmers. Likewise, Ahmed and Adams found that 
the Agricultural Bank of Sudan was limited to charging 7-9 
percent per year on loans when its administration costs average 
10-15 percent of the value of loans. 
The subsidization of costs can have an insidious impact on 
nonbanking institutions, and especially NGOs that function in a 
relatively resource rich environment. When resources are 
abundant, survival becomes unlinked from performance and self-
evaluation is not a priority (Sen) 5 . Administration is lax, 
costs are not controlled, and there is relative indifference to 
loan recovery. Commercial organizations working in a competitive 
environment face relatively greater pressure to perform. This 
gives them an entirely different orientation to lending opera-
tions and can increase their chances of long-term survival. This 
observation is relevant for many, but not all, banking opera-
tions. Nationalized banks are often a key exception. 
Subsidies also invite political intervention and corruption. 
Subsidized interest rates create an excess demand for funds so 
implicit rationing must occur. Political connections can 
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influence those who are the lucky few to get a loan. Rent-
seeking employees of the financial institutions exploit their 
opportunity to extract gifts or "tea money" for granting sub-
sidized loans. Leaders of cooperatives and credit unions use 
their positions to gain disproportionate access to loans. 
Borrowers with political leverage can avoid loan repayment while 
borrowers who "bought" their loans see little reason to repay. 
High loan delinquency is a logical outcome in these situations 
and this can severely weaken an institution. Incentives to repay 
decline even more when borrowers perceive that an institution is 
weak and they may not get a new loan after repaying the current 
one. 
Multiple Financial Services 
Entrepreneurs need financial services, not just loans. A 
program that offers only loans forces a borrower to obtain 
deposit, savings, and checking services elsewhere. A bank can 
offer these services in addition to the loan, along with other 
services such as the international transfer of funds that is 
important in labor exporting countries. Furthermore, depositors 
reveal important aspects about their financial management 
abilities by the way they conduct their deposit and savings 
operations. This information is useful when lenders process loan 
applications. Banks recognize the value of this information and 
often require that an enterprise maintain an account for several 
months before considering a loan (McLeod). The Grameen Bank 
requires an established record of weekly savings before a group 
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is considered for a loan (Hossain), and other programs have 
similar requirements. 
Accepting deposits also imposes discipline on an institu-
tion's lending because management realizes to keep itself 
credible it must have funds to meet depositor demand. By using 
its own funds for lending rather than relying solely on govern-
ment targeted programs, an institution can escape some political 
intervention over deciding who gets a loan and who must repay. 
This may also have a salutary effect on repayment when borrowers 
recognize they are stealing their neighbor's rather than the 
government's money when they default on loans. It is frequent in 
the Philippines, for example, to hear that a "dole-out" mentality 
affects repayment on government projects (Sacay, et. al). 
Cooperatives and credit unions performed well in Latin America in 
the 1960's. Many deteriorated in the 1970's, however, when they 
began to accept external funds (Marion). 
Graduation 
Many special programs propose to graduate participants once 
they improve their income and become credit worthy for regular 
financial institutions. The rationale for this idea recognizes 
that as enterprises grow, they pass through different stages of 
financial sophistication and the financing options widen as they 
build up their assets and their reputation (McLeod). It has also 
been recognized that programs should disburse small amounts as a 
first loan to a client. This will test repayment ability, but it 
will also avoid overburdening the business with more money that 
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it can invest wisely (Farbman). Traditional agricultural lenders 
have been criticized for being inflexible in determining amounts 
to be lent and have encouraged borrowers to accept more than 
really needed (Tendler, 1982). 
The data on graduation rates are sparse, however, and most 
program evaluations, if they mention the concept at all, fail to 
provide much evidence. The fact that data are not readily 
available suggests that in practice it may not really be that 
important a performance indicator for many programs. Clearly 
there are real disincentives for both program and borrower to 
graduate. If program loans are highly subsidized, a borrower 
will face higher costs when graduating to another source. The 
increase in size of loan the borrrower will obtain must be large 
if the cost differences are large. For the program, graduation 
implies losing an established good performing participant and 
substituting another with all the costs and learning that 
implies. Far better and cheaper if funds are tight to extend 
another loan to the established client. 
The graduation problem suggests that a better approach may 
be for the program not to directly lend but instead become an 
advocate to help participants obtain loans from financial 
institutions. Graduation to larger loans will then occur 
naturally as repeat loans are made to valued customers. Impor-
tant performance incentives can be given to the program by 
providing operating subsidies in direct proportion to the number 
of participants it successfully helps obtain loans. The programs 
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are also relieved of the costs of developing expertise to 
efficiently manage loan accounts and can concentrate resources 
instead on providing those nonfinancial services they can best 
provide. 6 
CONCLUSIONS 
Supply-leading rural finance has been an integral part of 
development policy in many developing countries during the past 
two decades. It has also been a vehicle through which donors 
have pumped billions of dollars of foreign assistance into 
developing countries. The results have been disappointing. 
Although there have been temporary increases in loans for a 
relatively few lucky borrowers, financial systems have not been 
created to provide on-going financial services. The amount of 
funds available to the rural sector, and especially small farm 
and nonfarm enterprises, has actually shrunk in many countries in 
the past few years after rising during the 1970s. 
The emphasis of the supply-leading strategy has been 
misplaced. Policymakers have addressed the supposed need for 
cheap loans by low income entrepreneurs and have ignored how the 
policies and programs they created undermined the viability of 
the financial institutions induced or created to make the loans. 
Evidence of the failure of the strategy can be seen by the 
multitude of failed and struggling banks, and dependent NGOs and 
PVOs that survive only through government and donor aid. 
Unviable institutions cannot hope to meet the financial needs of 
small enterprises. They can assist a few participants up to the 
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limits of their subsidies, but they cannot hope to expand their 
services to a broader number of equal deserving clients. The 
issue frequently boils down to serving fewer clients with lower-
cost loans versus reaching many through unsubsidized loans. 
Finance is important; a sound financial system is necessary 
for economic development. The development challenge is to create 
competitive, viable financial markets in which entrepreneurs of 
all income levels with appropriate projects will find loans, and 
all entrepreneurs and households will find suppliers for their 
checking, deposit and savings needs. Subsidizing a few entrepre-
neurs with cheap loans contributes little to developing a viable 
financial market and may even set it back. 
Strong financial institutions find it hard to succeed in the 
unfavorable economic environment that exists in many developing 
countries. Likewise, entrepreneurs cannot prosper in such an 
environment, and a few subsidized loans will not resolve their 
fundamental problems. As we struggle to find ways to assist the 
development of microenterprises, we must be alert to the fact 
that by tinkering with financial policies, we may just be 
addressing the symptoms of the problem, not the problem itself. 
.. 
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FOOTNOTES 
The characteristics of farm enterprises are well known and 
their financial patterns and problems are described in 
publications included in footnote number 3. Similar 
information on small nonfarm enterprises can be found in 
Anderson and Leiserson, and the considerable work done on 
the subject at Michigan State University, an example of 
which is the paper by Liedholm and Mead. 
The term supply-leading finance has been attributed to 
Patrick. 
This section summarizes a large literature discussing the 
supply-leading strategy and the results that have been 
obtained. Key readings include Adams and Graham; Adams, 
Graham and Von Pischke; Adams and Vogel; Chew; Donald; 
Howell; Lieberson; Schmidt and Kropp; Von Pischke; Von 
Pischke, Adams and Donald. 
An example of the impact of bank branching is found in the 
analysis by Khalily et. al of the expanded bank branching 
network in Bangladesh. 
Tendler (1983) came to the surprising conclusion that a 
small NGO specializing in credit in Brazil failed to develop 
a low-cost model because of its small budget and limited 
horizon. 
It is beyond the scope of this paper to 
that programs can effectively provide. 
attempt to analyze this question can be 
D'Zmura. 
discuss the services 
An example of an 
found in Kilby and 
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